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being Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. The talent of the time
is dramatically illustrated by Rossiter's exercise in composing a dif-
ferent list of delegates who might have comprised the Convention.
It is only slightly less illustrious than the actual assembly. If the
Convention was not, as Jefferson called it, "an assembly of demi-
gods," it was by any relevant standard a remarkable group, the
like of which we certainly could not muster today. The 1780s
were, to use Edmund S. Morgan's perceptive phrase, "the brief
period when America's intellectual leaders were her political lead-
ers."
It is disheartening, for me at least, to compare the period of our
national origins with the America of today. In his summary of the
political consensus of that day, Rossiter states:
Finally, it takes more than a perfect plan of government to
preserve that state of ordered liberty which is the mark of the
good society. Something else is needed, some quality of mind and
heart diffused among the people to strengthen the urge to peace-
ful obedience and among their governors to keep them from
sliding into corruption. In a republic that 'something else' is,
quite simply, public and private morality. Free government rests
at bottom on the moral basis of decent, brave, honest, liberty-
loving, industrious, patriotic men. Such men are the raw ma-
terials of free government, and there must be enough of them in
every society to overcome the obstinate forces of dishonor, un-
reason, sloth and cruelty.6
At the beginning of the Republic, America had the "something
else." Can the same be said for today?
WILLIAM P. MURPHY*
THE PRESS IN THE JURY Box. By Howard Felsher and Michael
Rosen. New York: Macmillan, 1966. Pp. 239. $4.95.
The coverage of criminal trials by mass news media is a subject
which continues to capture attention and yet persistently defies illu-
minating analysis. It is also the subject of a recent book by Howard
Felsher and Michael Rosen.1 The authors, as the title indicates,
have put the press in the jury box and found it "Guilty." Guilty
6 Id. at 63.
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of what they are not sure, but they propose a solution nevertheless:
there ought to be a law. Perhaps there should be, for there are
few, if any, legal inhibitions in most American jurisdictions regard-
ing press coverage of criminal trials; but whatever the merits of
their cause, this book fails to provide insights sufficiently persuasive
to send legislatures into night session to resolve the problem.
There is no doubt that both Mr. Felsher, a TV producer, and
Mr. Rosen, a lawyer, are deeply concerned with the spectre of
biased and pervasive media coverage of pending criminal proceed-
ings, and there is apparent throughout the book the public spirit
that must have prompted their undertaking. However, an aware-
ness of the problem, or even indignation, cannot substitute for
careful research and dispassionate discussion, if the objective is to
speed the process of reform. The absence of these qualities cannot
be excused by maintaining that the authors are addressing the gen-
eral reader, for in all likelihood the so-called general reader is
similar to Thurber's unicorn: You may say you have seen one, but
no one will believe you since no one else has. A book must meet
professional standards to be worth anyone's attention, and this one
fails to meet the standards of either accurate, objective journalism
or careful, well-reasoned, analytical legal writing.
The book is in the main a haphazard collection of anecdotally-
recited criminal cases, which are unaccompanied by citation, casual-
ly referred to, frequently unidentified and occasionally even mis-
read.2 The research reflected thereby is, to state the matter as
mildly as possible, impressionistic. The research technique is dis-
closed with disarming frankness. Mr. Felsher states: "I had no
fear that I would overlook a pertinent example. From all across the
country stories illustrating The Press in the Jury Box were mailed
to me."3 What can one say? The skeptic is struck dumb by such
honest faith.
Even where there are no blatant errors, there is an amateurish
quality about the writing, relieved only occasionally by a spritely
2 Compare the following interpretation of what most probably is New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964): "A U.S. Supreme Court decision . . . stated that
in a libel suit brought against a newspaper, proof of the libel itself is not enough
to win the case. The aggrieved party must also prove that the newspaper intended
the libel maliciously. This decision, obviously, grants great freedom to Newspapers,
since it is very nearly impossible to prove intent." FErSHER & ROSEN, op. Cit. supra
note 1, at 238.
3 1d. at 7
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style. The following piece of wide-eyed legal realism bears repeat-
ing:
One of the great imponderables, always, is the reaction of a
court of appeals. There is no way to predict with accuracy
whether it will affirm or reverse a conviction. Precedents that
seem to apply suddenly do not apply. Other precedents are sud-
denly overturned in thoroughly unforseen fashion.4
Not surprisingly, the book concludes with a plea for the enactment
of a "legislative statute." 5
Apart from a need for empirical data, there is obviously lacking
the thoughtful analysis which any exposition of the constitutional
and other legal problems presented by convergence of press and
criminal proceedings requires. A few of the standard United States
Supreme Court cases on the subject" are casually and unsystemati-
cally discussed.7 Attention is focused on a recent judicial declara-
tion that lawyers who divulge information about criminal proceed-
ings, pending or in progress, are in violation of Canons 5 and 20
of the Canons of Professional Ethics.8  Although the authors are
aware of the difficulty of tracing the sources of such information,
there is no discussion of whether the threat of disciplinary action is
so remote as to provide an ineffective deterrent to these undesirable
disclosures to the press. The rule of the English courts which pro-
hibits, on pain of a contempt citation, comment by newspapers be-
yond fair and accurate reporting of criminal proceedings0 is given
uncritical praise,1 but there appears no discussion of the possible
danger that the contempt power might be used by a thin-skinned
judiciary to protect not the accused, but judges themselves from
4 Id. at 50.
Id. at 236.6 E.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
7For example, Rideau v. Louisiana, supra note 6, a case involving a televised
interview prior to trial between a sheriff and a criminal accused and found in the
standard casebooks on constitutional law, is referred to as a "little known" case.
FELSHER & ROSEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 140. See DOWLING 8- GUNTHER, CASES ON
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 814 (1965); LOCKHART, KAMISAR & CHOPER, CASES ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 816-19 (1964).
8 State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964).
" FELSHER & ROSEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 95.
10 Once a warrant has been issued, the case is "pending," and comment by the press
beyond what may be characterized as a fair and accurate report is prohibited. E.g.,
Rex v. Editor of the Evening Standard, 40 T.L.R. 833 (K.B. 1924). See Gillmor,
Free Press and Fair Trial in English Law, 22 WASH. 8: LEE L. REv. 17 (1965); Good-
hart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 I-HAv. L. REv. 885 (1935).
1"FLsHFR & RosEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 208-10.
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critical review in the press. The book concludes by supporting the
model statute proposed by Judge Meyer of the New York Supreme
Court regarding the availability and desirability of a statutory solu-
tion to the problem. 12 The authors have selected an interesting
standard bearer,13 but it is unfortunate that they fail to give any
attention to the problems raised by an exclusively statutory solution
on the state level.
The complexities of this subject; the competing constitutional
considerations; the possible contradiction in terms between the
"public" trial and the "fair" trial; the danger of moving to free the
accused from publicity only in the end to insulate the judiciary
from criticism; and the trojan horse aspect of the contempt power
are formidable obstacles to the drafting of adequate solutions.
Nevertheless, these obstacles must be analyzed in terms of specific
legislative and judicial remedies, 4 rather than in terms of the
Pollonius-type pronouncements that dominate the present approach-
es in this field. While all can join in deploring the prejudice that
publicity injects into the concept of a fair trial, we are about to
drown in crocodile tears. What we need is thoughtful recommen-
dation, based on sound empirical research. What this book provides,
however, is no more than another jeremiad against the press.
JEROME A. BARRON*
12 Id. at 236-39.
18 See address by Judge Meyer, in Symposium: Fair Trial-Free Press, Crim. Law
Bull., Apr. 1966, 26-37; Meyer, Free Press v. Fair Trial: The Judge's View, 41 N.D.L.
Rev. 14 (1964).
1' The book was written prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), in which the Court held that Sheppard's trial for
the murder of his wife had been conducted amid such "inherently prejudicial pub-
licity" as to compel the reversal of the conviction as a matter of constitutional law.
From the extensive exposition of the circumstances of that case found in this book,
FELSHER & ROSEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 69-78, it appears safe to surmise that the
authors welcome the decision.
However, the fact that the Court in Sheppard failed to make mandatory any
procedures for preventing such prejudicial publicity in the future indicates an un-
willingness to prescribe immutable constitutional strictures in such a sensitive area
at the present time. No single one of the suggestions in Sheppard was given any
sort of legally binding endorsement, not to speak of constitutional compulsion. This
is particularly ironic in light of the fact that the trial judge is reproached by the
Court for merely "suggesting" and "requesting" that the jury not "expose them-
selves to comment upon the case." But the language of command, enforced by
well-described sanctions, is what is dearly absent from the Court's own opinion in
Sheppard.
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